Also kept the Target OS as Windows 7 and target Platform to be Desktop. Also, do not leave a readable kernel image (the attacker can easily extract symbols out of it) or readable modules (the attacker might be able to trigger their loading) lying around. While the former is always a privileged operation, the latter is usually not. Although the exploitation approaches are somewhat similar among these three allocators, the OpenSolaris slab allocator has some unique features, among them the use of a Magazine layer (along with per-CPU caches, which today are common to all slab allocator implementations) to improve allocator scalability. It is really interesting to see how just a few pieces of seemingly unconnected or useless information can be leveraged to sensibly raise the odds of a successful and reliable exploitation. Mario Santana, in Network and System Security (Second Edition), 2014. Leaks can occur on virtually any memory allocation, and thus can return information about: Stack addresses/values This is by far the most useful type of leak (after a full kernel memory leak, obviously), because you may not have any other way to deduce where your kernel stack is in memory. While configuring the COM to attach debugger mentioned. Finally, within our ucred struct lie the cr_uid and cr_ruid elements. The first piece of information we can easily grab from the system is the exact version of the running kernel. The training will follow a theoretical and practical (hands-on) approach. The solution to this issue is to have the software and hardware cooperate. Please note that 0x222003h is the IOCTL code for this function call since it leads to the respective function. This chapter models kernel level attacks under the looking glass of the three principles of information security: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Click on Active Services to quickly check whether the driver is running or not. The use of the high-precision time stamp counter (RDTSC/TSC) that we mentioned earlier is a good example of the former. Once again, it is interesting to understand how we can leverage these seemingly harmless details in our exploit. File>New>Project>Visual c++ >Windows Driver>KMDF. Exploit Development: Windows Kernel Exploitation - Arbitrary Overwrites (Write-What-Where) 15 minute read Introduction. There are some heavily used tables (e.g., the table that associates each interrupt to a specific handler) that are too expensive to implement purely in hardware. OSSTMM provides security professionals with a well-defined, mature framework that can be implemented in conjunction with many of the topics covered in this book. Inside these pages you might find stored SSH keys, passwords, or mapped files that could lead to a direct compromise of the system. A successful exploit could result in elevated permissions and what you can do is only bound by your imagination (anywhere from cool homebrew to APT-sponsored malware). Also, this will be useful for us when to set the buffer from user size. File>New>Project>Visual c++ >Windows Driver>KMDF. We will go into more details about exploit-relevant exported information in Part II. The techniques used in order to exploit this kind of vulnerability are a bit different from exploiting a userland application. One of the most interesting types of information that we might be able to infer regards the layout of the kernel in memory and, especially, the addresses at which its critical structures or its text (the executable binary image) are mapped. In this chapter we also talked about combined user and kernel address space versus separated address space design. The crew responsible for creating and distributing Backtrack Linux also offer a hands-on highly intense series of classes. Now let’s load the driver using OSRloader. This second case is far more common than you may think for a lot of users. or, if you are not able to retrieve kernel symbols otherwise, give you a precise offset to use inside your exploit. I have recently came across (well, not entirely by myself… cheers Nahuel!) In such a case, your exploit should detect the situation and give you a chance to stop so that you have time to check the specific version and come back later with a working version. Even traditional universities are beginning to get into the security mode today. Also, we mentioned a common (last resort) technique for both of them, which is based on overwriting the adjacent page. I will show how to put the victim object (struct packet_sock in this post) next adjacent to the vulnerable buffer (packet rv_ring buffer in previous post). It does not depend on a vulnerability on the kernel, but simply on the clever use of the architecture and its interfaces. We will discuss each one of them in Part II of this book. Kernel Pool Exploitation An attacker’s ability to leverage pool corruption vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code in ring 0 Similar to traditional heap exploitation Kernel pool exploitation requires careful modification of kernel pool structures Access violations are likely to end up with a bug check (BSOD) Up until Windows 7, kernel pool overflows could be We will cover remote information gathering together with remote exploitation techniques in Chapter 7. Since this book is about writ- For additional information or pricing quotes please send an email to training@immunityincdotcom. Remote kernel exploitation can be—and most of the time is—more complicated than local kernel exploitation, just like writing remote user-land exploits is more complicated than writing local ones. AWE is a particularly demanding penetration testing course. The second one allows you to write one-shot exploits that work on a large variety of targets, and thus reduce the odds of panicking a machine. Unless the leak is pretty wide (you can retrieve a lot of kernel memory from user land) and/or very controllable (you can decide what area of the kernel to leak; note that in such a case you are usually able to leak as much memory as you want by repeating the attack), this kind of vulnerability does not lead to a compromise of the machine. We'll cover two main implementations here: The OpenSolaris slab allocator: What better way to start our analysis of heap attacks than with the operating system that first saw a slab allocator implemented? We mentioned /proc/kallsyms on the Linux kernel. We divided memory corruption vulnerabilities into two main families: heap and stack based. And if the system does not cooperate (say, in the presence of some kernel protection), how cool would it be if the underlying architecture could tell you?
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